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WILL-INCOME INTERESTS-RENUNCIATION AFTER ACCEPTANCE
-PARTIAL RENUNCIATION-TAXATION.-The concept of a dis-
claimer has been known to equity and the common law for several
centuries . In English courts its general characteristics and the
respects in which it differs from the concepts of a release and a
surrender are so well established that they are rarely discussed at any
length in the modern cases . Most of the recent decisions are
concerned either with the effects of a disclaimer on the interests of
other beneficiaries under a trust or with the consequences under tax
statutes of different kinds .
Similar questions have arisen in Canada but, in addition,
Canadian courts have recently been confronted with some rather
more fundamental issues . These can be formulated as follows : (a)
can an adult income beneficiary, who has received payments of
income under a trust, make a valid disclaimer of his income interest
at some subsequent time? (b) can an income beneficiary disclaim
income for a limited period before any payments of income have
been received? (c) if a disclaimer of the remaining part of the interest
is possible in (a), could a disclaimer for a limited period be made in
such circumstances?
It seems unquestionable that English law would give a negative
answer to the first question . In the seventeenth century the nature
and effect of a disclaimer were described in Sheppard's Touchstone
as follows : 11
If one devise his land to another in fee-simple, fee tail, for life, or years, and
the devisee after the death of the testator doth refuse and waive the estate
devised to him; in this case, and by this means the devise to him is become
void . And it seems a verbal waiver is sufficient in this case . So if one give
goods or chattels to another, and the devisee refuse it ; by this means the devise
is become void, and any waiver or refusal would suffice in this case ; for a man
shall not be compelled nolens volens to take a thing devised to him.
As, by definition, a disclaimer is simply a refusal to accept an
interest which has been conveyed to the disclaiming party, it has
been consistently held that no disclaimer is possible after the interest
has been accepted . In Bence v . Gilpin,' Kelly C.B . made the point
with some emphasis :
A disclaimer, to be worth anything, must be an act whereby one entitled to an
estate immediately and before dealing with it renounces it; whereby, in effect,
he says "I will not be the owner of this property". But for a person who has
already possessed himself of an estate and acted as its owner, to come and say
"I will not be its owner", is really a contradiction in terms . . . .3
Where the subject matter of the transfer is an income interest
1 (2nd ed ., 1648), p . 452. .
2 (1868), L.R. Ex . 76 .
3 Ibid ., at p. 81 .
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under a trust or estate, the English cases leave little, if any, room for
an argument that a disclaimer can be made after the disclaiming party
has accepted income for any period of time . In Re Wimperis, 4 for
example, executors had been directed to set aside a fund sufficient to
produce a yearly income of $250.00 for a particular beneficiary . The
beneficiary was a married woman and the annuity was given to her
without power of anticipation . The issue which was raised before
Warrington J . was whether the restraint on anticipation invalidated
an attempted disclaimer by the beneficiary . It was held that,
although the restraint would have been effective to bar a release of
the annuity after it had been accepted, the restraint did, not attach
until acceptance had occurred . As the disclaimer signified a refusal
to accept, it was not affected by the restraint and would be valid
unless the bequest had been accepted at some earlier time . The judge
held, further, that the beneficiary's acceptance of the annuity could
not be inferred from the facts . He stated that no payment of the
annuity had been made and that the beneficiary's part in negotiations
to arrange a settlement of her rights under the will did not indicate
her acceptance of those rights . The whole tenor of the judge's
reasoning indicates that the restraint upon anticipation would have
applied if payments had been made and accepted . If this were not
correct, the established rule that a married woman without power of
anticipation could not release an income interests would have had
virtually no significance . It is, moreover, difficult to think of any
acts which would indicate acceptance less equivocally than the
receipt of income and its application for the purposes of the
beneficiary .
The fundamental distinction between the disclaimer which, for
most purposes, avoids a gift of an interest ab initio and the various
methods by which a person can divest himself of a proprietary
interest which he has previously accepted has been recognized for
centuries . After having accepted his interest, a life tenant under a
trust might subsequently dispose of it by assigning it to another
beneficiary or to a third party, by directing the trustee to hold it on
trust for such a person, by declaring himself to be a trustee s by
surrendering it to some other beneficiary' or by releasing it to the
trustees with the intention of extinguishing it . 8 In some
4 [1914] 1 Ch . 502 (Ch.D .) . See, also, Re Guinness's Settlement, [1966] 1
W.L.R . 1355, discussed infra .
-'Lady Bateman v . Faber, [1898] 1 Ch . 144 (Ch.D .) .
6Re Chrimes, [1917] 1 Ch . 30 ; Timpson's Executors v . Yerby, [1936] 1 K .B .
645 (C .A .) ; Grey v . I.R .C ., [1960] A.C . 1 (H.L .) .
7 E.g ., Re Young's Settlement Trusts, [1959] 1 W.L.R . 457 (Ch.D .) ; Re
Harker's Will Trusts, [1969] 1 W .L.R . 1124 (Ch.D .) .
8 See, infra, pp . 320-321 .
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circumstances, significant consequences might follow from the
choice of one or other of these methods . They_ share, however, the
characteristic that they are essentially dispositions of subsisting
interests, and that characteristic distinguishes each of them from a
disclaimer . Where an interest is disclaimed, it is treated as if it had
never been acquired by the disclaiming party.' If, after it has been
accepted, it is subsequently assigned, released or surrendered, an
existing property interest will pass from the original beneficiary to
some other person by virtue of the deliberate act of the former . The
fact that in some cases the interest will be extinguished in the sense
that it will lose its separate identity should not be allowed to obscure
the dispositive nature of the beneficiary's act or to obscure the
distinction between a disclaimer on the one hand, and a renunciation
of an existing interest on the other. Whether or not the interest will
cease to have a separate existence depends not on the nature of the
act or the intention of a disclaiming, assigning, or renouncing
beneficiary, but solely on the extent of the pre-existing interests, if
any, which the future recipients of the income have under the estate .
If; for example, the recipients have immediate capital interests
which are absolutely vested, or vested defeasibly, the income
interest will lose its separate identity whether it is disclaimed,
assigned or renounced . 10 If they have only contingent interests, the
income interest may continue to have a separate existence
notwithstanding the fact that it is disclaimed by the original
beneficiary ." The fact that the interest remains in existence or that it
disappears tells us nothing significant about the nature of the act by
which the beneficiary divested himself of the income . The
fundamental distinction is that the beneficiary who assigns or
renounces is disposing of his own property, while the beneficiary
who disclaims is refusing to acquire the property of another.
'Townson v . Tickell (1819), 3 B . & Ald . 31 (K .B .), at pp . 36-38 . Where a
question of taxation has been involved, courts have been prepared to recognize that,
prior to the disclaimer, the beneficiary was "competent to dispose" of the interest :
Re Parsons, [1943] Ch . 12 (C.A .), and that he had a "right" which could be
extinguished : Re Stratton's Disclaimer, [1958] 1 Ch . 42 (C .A .) followed in Keir
Estate v . M.N.R . (1965), 65 D.T.C . 679 (T.A.B .) . These cases on the construction
of taxation statutes do not affect the proposition that, in property law, the disclaimer
is treated as making the gift void ab initio ; "a disclaimer operates by way of
avoidance and not by way of disposition" : Re Paradise Motor Company Ltd, [1968]
I W.L.R . 1125 (C . A .), at p . 1143 .
to For the effect of a disclaimer, see Re Flower's Settlement Trusts, [1957] 1
W,L .R . 401 (Ch .D .), at p . 405, per Jenkins L . J . and Re Taylor, [1957] 1 W.L.R .
1043 (Ch.D .) . For the effect of an assignment or surrender see Re Harker's Will
Trusts, supra, footnote 7, Re Kebty-Fletcher's Will Trusts, [196713 All E.R . 1076
(Ch-D .) and Re Bellville's Settlement Trusts, [1964] Ch.D . 163 (Ch .D .) .
"Re Scott, [1975] 1 W.L .R . 1260 (Ch .D .) .
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The existence of the distinction has been recognized in a
number of recent cases in England . In Re Bellville's Settlement
Trusts ,12 for example, property had been settled on trust for the
settlor's wife for life, with remainder to his son absolutely if the son
should be living at the death of the wife, and with further gifts to take
effect in the event that the son should predecease the wife . Nine
years after the trusts of income had come into operation, the wife
purported to assign the life interest to her son "to the intent that such
interest shall merge and be extinguished and that the entire interest
therein shall become immediately vested in possession in [the son]" .
Wilberforce J . held that the assignment and release did not destroy
the life interest : 13
This is not the case of a disclaimer : and the only way in which the prior trust,
including the life interest, could determine would be if the life interest was
merged in a subsequent estate . . . . Cases of disclaimer, seem to me to be very
different from the kind of case I have here . They are cases where there is a
disappearance of an interest which the testator has created, so that there is a gap
in the trust, and it is necessary to fill that gap in some way or other in
accordance with what one assumes to have been the intention of the testator,
and the doctrine of acceleration is applied as being the way of reaching the
result that the testator would have intended to have carried out . But, this is not
a case of a gap . This is a case of a subsisting trust, and one has to ascertain
whether the trust has been ended or not .
As the remainder interest of the son was contingent on his
surviving the widow, and as other persons would become entitled to
the fund if that event did not occur, it was held that the release did
not produce a merger of the life interest with the remainder interest .
It is clear that, in emphasizing that he was not concerned with the
case in which there was a "gap" in the trust, Wilberforce J . was
attributing significance to the fact that the interest was subsisting at
the time of the release and not to the fact that the beneficiary had
indicated the persons whom she wished to benefit . There could be no
gap once the interest had been accepted . 14
Although, at first sight . it might seem difficult to reconcile the
last proposition with the decision of Goff J . in Re Guinness's
Settlement, l5 there is no inconsistency between the two cases . Under
clause 4 of the settlement the settlor's wife was entitled to the
income from the settled property for life . Less than eighteen months
after the settlement was executed, she executed the following
release :
' 2 Supra, footnote 10 .
13 1bid ., at pp . 168 and 173 .
14 The same distinction is implicit in the discussion of Re Davies, [19571 1
W.L.R . 922 (Ch.D .) in Re Kebty-Fletcher's Will Trusts, supra, footnote 10 andRe
Harker's Will Trusts, supra, footnote 7 .
15 Supra, footnote 4 .
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Mrs. Guinness as beneficial owner hereby releases unto the trustees all that the
estate and interest of Mrs. Guinness in all the income, of the trust fund to
become payable hereafter during the life of Mrs. Guinness and all her right,
title, claim and demand to and in the same to the intent that the settlement may
henceforth be read and construed as if clause 4 thereof aforesaid were deleted .
It was held that the release created a "hiatus" in the trust so that the
property "resulted" 16 back to the settlor. This conclusion was
reached entirely on the basis of the beneficiary's intention as
revealed by the words in the deed or release . The life tenant had, in
effect, directed the trustees to deal with the future income as if the
settlement did not contain clause 4. It was conceded that, if the
settlement had been constructed in that manner, the income would
have been held on a resulting trust . 17 In short, the hiatus or gap
created by the release was not produced by an ineffective disposition
of the settlor ; it was created by the life tenant's direction that the
income interest was to be dealt with as if the settlor had made an
ineffective disposition., Goff J. placed all the emphasis on the
intention of the life tenant and, despite the short duration of the
settlement, he recognized expressly that no disclaimer of the interest
had occurred "because she had already begun to enjoy it" .1$
The decision in Re Guinness's Settlement underlines one of the
necessary consequences of the distinction .between a disclaimer of an
interest and a renunciation or disposition after its acceptance : the
destination of the disclaimed income is determined solely by the
intention of the settlor or testator or by the law governing distribution
or intestacy; the destination of income, which has been renounced or
otherwise disposed of after acceptance, is determined, in the first
place, solely by the intention of the beneficiary.
A further illustration is provided by Re Young's Settlement
Trusts" where a life tenant purported to "irrevocably surrender and
forego the interest for life to which he is entitled under the settlement
in the income of the property comprised therein to the intent that
[his] life interest in any and every part of such income shall
henceforth be absolutely determined" . Harman J. said :
My difficulty has been that inthe deed [of surrender] there was no mention of a
surrender to any person . Coke on Littleton, 17th edn. sec. 636, reads as
follows :
is The use of the term "resulting trust" in the judgment is a little confusing as
the fact that the income "resulted" to the estate was determined by the intention of
the life tenant and not by that of the settlor ; nor was it a consequence of an ineffective
disposition by the latter . For a discussion of the two varieties of resulting trusts see
Vandervell v. I.R.C ., [196712 A .C . 291 (H.L .), at pp . 312-314, per Lord Upjohn .
l ' Supra, footnote 4, at p. 1361 .
Is Ibid ., at p. 1363 .
is Supra, footnote 7.
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"Surrender . . . is a yielding up an estate for life or years to him that hath an
immediate estate in reversion or remainder . . ." .Z°
By implication from the use of the word "surrender", he held that
the remaindermen were entitled .
Neither Re Guinness's Settlement nor Re Young's Settlement
Trusts indicates how an English court would deal with the case of a
simple release to the trustees where no clear intention to benefit
particular persons appeared . On the assumption that the release was
made to the trustees in their capacity as such, the alternatives would
seem to be to treat it as invalid for uncertainty, or lack of sufficient
formality, or to presume that the beneficiary intended future income
to be distributed as if the instrument contained no express disposition
of income. The last solution appears to be the most reasonable and is
supported by decisions in Ontario 2l and in the United States .22
The dispositive nature of a surrender was recognized in the
English Court of Appeal in Inland Revenue Commissioners v .
Buchanan . 23 An income beneficiary for life had a protected interest
which she was permitted to surrender in favour of the remaindermen
alone . When she executed a surrender in accordance with the terms
of the instrument, it was argued that this completed a disposition
made by the testator and involved no disposition by her . The three
judges of the Court of Appeal were unanimous in rejecting the
argument:
Mr . Russell has argued very strenuously that a surrender is not a disposition. I
should have great difficulty in holding that : I think it clearly is a disposition. A
person can dispose of his interest in a fund or in a chattel or in anything else in a
variety of ways, but if having an interest in a fund, although the interest may
not then be in possession, he surrenders that interest, it seems to me that he
disposes of that interest . Still more is it clear in my mind that if he surrenders
the interest the person next entitled to that interest or to the income under the
interest becomes thereby advanced . 21
Persuasive as that argument is, I find myself unable to accept it . It is true that
[the life tenant's] interest was a protected life interest, but she was left free as
regards dealing with it in one particular way: that is to say, by way of surrender
in favour of persons entitled in remainder. She was entitled to the income under
the protective trust, and it was for her to decide at her will and pleasure whether
she should retain that income or surrender it for the benefit of those interested
in the remainder, namely, her three infant children . She chose to take the latter
course, and the result was that the income she would otherwise have been
20 Ibid ., at p. 464. See, also, Re Penton's Settlements, [19683 1 W.L .R . 248
(Ch.D .), at p. 261 .
2' Re Graydon, [1942] O.W.N . 130, discussed infra .
22 See Scott on Trusts (3rd ed ., 1967), pp . 2732-2735.
23 [19581 Ch . 289 (C.A .) .
24 Ibid ., at p. 296, per Lord Goddard C .J .
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enjoying as life tenant from the moment when her life interest fell into
possession went to the children and became payable or applicable to them or for
their benefit . Accordingly, I am unable to accept that part of Mr. Russell's
argument .2s
In cases in which the only question is the power of the income
beneficiary to divest himself or herself of the right to income and
vest it in another beneficiary, the distinctions between a disclaimer,
a surrender and a disposition will usually be of no significance unless
a question of formality is in issue . A disclaimer of an equitable
interest can be ora1 26 but a release, surrender or disposition of such
an interest will probably not be valid unless it is in writing .27
Cases involving restraints upon anticipation are not likely to
arise with any-frequency in the future, but an issue similar to that in
Re Wimperis 28 could arise under the modern forms of protective
trusts . Under such trusts property is usually settled to pay the income
to a particular beneficiary for life or until he should do any act which
would deprive him of the right to receive the income and, in the latter
event, discretionary trusts for the beneficiary and his family are to
come into effect until his death . If, in such a case, the income
beneficiary attempted to surrender his interest to the ultimate
remainderman, the attempt would appear to be ineffective and the
discretionary trust would come into operation . If, however, he
disclaimed his interest, the reasoning in Re Wimperis would suggest
that the disclaimer would be valid .
Another area in which the distinction between the different
concepts could have some importance is that of taxation . Whereas, a
release or a surrender of an existing interest might well be regarded
as a disposition" and, if made gratuitously, a gift, it could be argued
that in the absence of any special statutory provision, a disclaimer
should be regarded differently . For the purposes of gift tax in
Ontario such a special provision exists . 3o
zs Ibid ., at pp . 297-298, per Jenkins, L.J . "As I see it, a man does not cease to
own property simply by saying `I don't want it' . If he tries to give it away the
question must always be, has he succeeded in doing so or not . ": Vandervell v. Z .R.C .,
[1966] Ch .D . 261, at p. 275, per Plowman J., approved by Lord Upjohn, supra,
footnote 16, at p . 314.
'6 Re Paradise Motor Company Ltd, supra, footnote 9, at p . 1143 .
2' Grey v . I .R .C ., supra, footnote 6; Scott on Trusts, op . cit ., footnote 22, pp .
2733-2734.
"Supra, footnote 4.
"The reasoning in I .R .C . v . Buchanan, supra, footnote 23, would seem
equally applicable for the purposes of Canadian income tax and succession duty in
Ontario . In addition, a surrender would seem to fall within s. 54(c)(ii)(B) of the
Income Tax Act, S .C ., 1970-71-72, c. 63 and s . I(g) (i)(ii) and (viii) of The
Succession Duty Act, R.S .O ., 1970, c'. 449.
36 The Gift Tax Act, S.O ., 1972, c . 12 s. 4(2)(b) ; Re Stratton's Disclaimer,
supra, footnote 12 ; Keir Estate v . M.N.R ., supra, footnote 9.
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Under the Income Tax Act the position is not altogether clear,
but, as a gift of an income interest can produce severe tax
consequences for the donor, the question is of some practical
importance." The position of Revenue Canada, as set out in
Interpretation Bulletin IT-385, Renunciation of an Income Interest
in a Trust, is that a true disclaimer will prevent the disclaiming party
from acquiring an interest . 32 In consequence, it will not produce
proceeds of disposition and will not give rise to an inclusion in the
income of the donor . More remarkably, the Bulletin seems to
indicate that a gratuitous surrender or release of an income interest
will not be treated as a disposition :
5 . A taxpayer who for no consideration validly renounces his income interest
in respect of future payments (not due and payable at the time of the
renunciation) will not be considered to have received any proceeds of
disposition . The result will be the same if the taxpayer designates or otherwise
agrees which person or persons will benefit by reason of the renunciation, if the
same person or persons would be entitled to benefit in the same way without
such designation or agreement .
There must be some doubt whether this position is required by the
terms of the Income Tax Act . As was recognized in Inland Revenue
Convnissioners v . Buchanan '33 a renunciation of the type
contemplated is in substance a disposition of the property of the
person who executes it . For the reasons given above' 34 the fact that it
will in some cases result in the extinguishment of the interest through
merger or enlargement should hardly be material . As the decision in
Re Bellville's Settlement35 illustrates, this does not always occur
and, when it does occur, it results from the nature of the pre-existing
interests of the persons who receive the benefit of the release or
surrender and not from the kind of act performed by the original
beneficiary of the interest which is extinguished . The consequences
in property law will be precisely the same whether an income
beneficiary has purported to assign his interest, or to surrender it, to
the remainderman . 36
31 Supra, footnote 29, s . 106(2)(a) ; discussed in M.C . Cullity, Estate Planning
in Canada (1977), 25 Can . Tax J . 180 . The discussion antedated the release of
Interpretation Bulletin IT-385 .
32 Para . 2 .
33 Supra, footnote 23 .
"Supra, p . 319 .
3 ' Supra, footnote 10 .
3s English courts have usually refused to attribute significance to the particular
form of words used by the disclaiming or renouncing party : e .g ., in Nicholson v .
lVordsworth (1818), 2 Swans . 363 (L.C .), a "release" was treated as a disclaimer,
and in Re Schar, [195012 All E . R . 1069 (Ch . D .) a "disclaimer" was treated as a
release . However, as Re Young's Settlement Trusts . supra, footnote 7, illustrates, the
beneficiary's description of the act might provide an indication of the intended
destination of the income .
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It is not clear whether the concession in paragraph 5 of the
Bulletin applies only to a surrender 'Of the right to all of the income
payments which the party who has executed the surrender would
otherwise have been entitled to receive . If it applies to renunciations
for a limited period ; it would, for example, permit a life tenant under
a trust to renounce income for the following year while retaining the
right to accept it, or to renounce it, for future years ." The Bulletin is
also silent on the question of attribution of income where an existing
interest has been renounced . While it seems clear that a disclaimer
will not be regarded as a transfer or a disposition, paragraph 5
appears to contain no similar implication .
The second question was whether in English law an income
beneficiary can disclaim income for a limited period before any
payment had been accepted . There appear to be no decisions directly
in point . In one line of cases in which beneficiaries under a will have
attempted to disclaim onerous devises or bequests while accepting
other benefits, the validity of the disclaimer has been held to depend
upon whether the testator had intended to make a single undivided
gift or separate gifts . Only in the latter case will the disclaimer be
effective . It is clear that these decisions do not turn on any principle
that a beneficiary who accepts a benefit under a will must accept all
the provisions of the will, including those Which impose burdens on
him."' If this were so, a disclaimer in the case of separate gifts
should be as ineffective as in the case of a single undivided gift .
The most detailed analysis of the English authorities is
contained in the judgment of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Re
Pearce . 39 The conclusion reached by the court placed the emphasis
entirely on the intention of the testator and denied any significance to
the distinction between beneficial and onerous gifts :
. . . the principle is much broader than is contended for by counsel . The only
question in the interpretation of a will is, What was the intention of the
testator? When two distinct bequests are given in the will the question remains,
What was the intention of the testator? Are they to be taken together, or may
one be taken and the other left? It would be unlikely, if both were acceptable to
the donee, that he would take one and decline the other. If one was not
acceptable to him it could be fairly assumed that it was not in his opinion
advantageous, but was burdensome and onerous . Hence the distinction that
would generally apply and the use,of those words in the authorities is simply a
convenient way of distinguishing that which was acceptable to the donee and
which he wished to retain, and that which he wished to disclaim . Therefore it is
a7 See Rose Herman v. M.N.R . (1961), 61, D.T .C . 700 (T.A .B .), a decision
which is inconsistent with that in Re Skinner, [197013 O.R . 35 (Ont . H.C .) ; see,
infra, p. 329.
as In Codrington v. Codrington (1876), L.R . 7H.L . 854, at p. 866, the doctrine
of election was explained upon this basis .
11 (1926), 45 N.Z.L.R . 699 (C.A .) .
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not essential to prove, in order to apply the rule, that the gift is onerous, in the
sense of entailing a financial burden . To do so would limit the application of
the overriding principle that the intention of the testator is the real question .
Bearing that in mind the principle is clear, and may be thus stated : Where a
testator gives two distinct properties in the same will to the same person and
one of these is not acceptable to the donee, primafacie he is entitled to disclaim
it and take the other . But in some cases it is a question of the intention of the
testator, to be gathered from the will, whether the donee must elect to take all
or none of the gifts in the will, or whether he may accept the one gift and
repudiate the other . In cases, however, where both properties are included in
the same gift the donee cannot accept the one and disclaim the other, unless the
will manifests a sufficient intention of the testator to the contrary . 40
On this basis, the rule that there can be no disclaimer of a single
undivided gift is simply a presumption or rule of construction which
will bow to an indication of a contrary intention .
The analysis in Re Pearce is supported by English decisions"
and its emphasis on the intention of the testator is consistent with the
conclusions in most of the English treatises . 42 It suggests that a
disclaimer of an income interest for a limited period would not be
effective unless there was something to indicate the testator's
intention that this should be permitted .
Obviously, this conclusion is not absolutely compelling . Rules
or presumptions of construction are generally applied much less
rigidly in modern cases and, in the absence of special circumstances,
it is not altogether clear why the testator should be presumed, in
effect, to have made the gift of the income interest conditional on
acceptance of the entire interest or, indeed, why he should not be
presumed to have been totally indifferent on the question . However,
if the above is correct, the question does not turn on anything
inherent in the concept of a disclaimer . At least as far as
testamentary gifts are concerned, it is to be determined solely as a
problem of construction and any doubt which exists is confined to
the presumption which a court will apply in the absence of any clear
indication of the testator's intention .
There are two other English decisions on testamentary gifts
40 Ibid ., at pp . 716-717 .
41 See, in particular, Warren v . Rudall (1860), 1 John . & H.1, where
Page-Wood V.-C . stated that "the question is one of intent only" and denied that
there was "any rigid formula" that required a legatee to accept all the provisions of
the will, Guthrie v . Walrond (1883), L.R . 22 Ch.D . 573 (Ch.D .), at p . 577 ; Re Joel,
[1943) 1 Ch.D . 311 (C.A .) .
41 Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd ed ., 1962), Vol . 39, p . 933 ; Williams on
Wills (4th ed ., 1974), pp . 256-257 ; Bailey, The Law of Wills (6th ed . . 1967), pp .
131-132 . See, also Atkinson on Wills (2nd ed ., 1953), p . 775 . Williams and
Mortimer, Executors, Administrators and Probate (1970), pp . 778-779 and Jarman
on Wills (8th ed ., 1951), pp . 565-567 place more emphasis on the onerous nature of
the gift .
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which might be regarded as having some limited relevance to the
question of a partial disclaimer of an income interest . In Re Young43
and Re Cranstoun's Wills Trusts44 it was held that the unlimited
disclaimer of an interest could subsequently be revoked if no other
person had acted to his detriment on the faith of it . In a later case 45
the English Court of Appeal refused to accept this proposition for the
case of inter vivos gifts and it expressly left open the question
whether the cases on wills were correctly decided . While the notion
of beneficial interests vesting in a beneficiary, being divested by a
disclaimer and vesting in some other person and then, on the
revocation of the disclaimer, revesting in the original beneficiary
may smack of conceptual untidiness, that is probably the worst
criticism that could be made of those cases. The fact that revocation
might not be permitted under the old law relating to conveyances by
deeds or in cases of other inter vivos transfers where the donor is
informed of, and accepts, the disclaimer, should not necessarily be
decisive when the question arises under a will .
If Re Young and Re Cranstoun's Will Trusts were correctly
decided, they would provide some persuasive support for the
proposition that a beneficiary should be able to disclaim his income
interest for a limited period . If it is possible to disclaim an income
interest in its entirety, and then to revoke the disclaimer, it would be
curious if it is not possible to disclaim the interest for a limited
period at the outset . Be this as it may-, on the present state of the
English authorities, it seems most likely that a testamentary gift of
such an interest would be regarded as a single gift and incapable of
being disclaimed in part .
It will be noted that, if it were possible to make a limited
disclaimer, a further question would be whether the disclaimer could
be renewed from year to year . Most probably, this would not be
permitted because of the rule that acceptance would be presumed
unless a disclaimer is made within a reasonable time of the vesting of
the gift .
The answer to the third question follows logically from the
answer to the first . If it is not possible in English law for a
beneficiary who is sui juris to disclaim an income interest after
payments of income have been accepted, a limited disclaimer at such
a time must also be ineffective.
There have been three decisions in Ontario in which the issues
considered above have been raised .
43 19131 1 Ch . 272 (Ch.D .) . -
44 (19493 Ch . 523 (Ch.D .) .
"Re Paradise Motor Company Ltd, supra, footnote 9, at p . 1143 .
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In Re Graydon ' 46 the testator's widow was entitled, inter alia,
to a share of the income from his estate until his death . She received
income for more than ten years and then notified the executor that she
did not wish to receive further benefits from the estate .
Subsequently, she executed a document in which she purported to
"renounce, disclaim and forever release" all benefits due to her
under her husband's will or upon his intestacy . The executor applied
to the court for advice and directions as to the future distribution of
the income and his counsel questioned whether the purported
renunciation and disclaimer could be effective after the widow's
acceptance of income for a number of years . Gillanders J.A . referred
to the decisions on onerous gifts and to that in Re Young" and
concluded as follows:"
It is submitted that, upon acceptance of any part of the income provided for her,
a life estate becomes vested in her, and cannot be disclaimed . She has,
however, refused to accept further payments of income from the trustee, there
are no conditions or obligations attached to the receipt of this income, or the
receipt of any payments she has received in the past . When no-one else is
prejudicially affected by her action and she has not formally renounced her
claim and refused to accept further payments . I fail to see why the income on
hand and that accruing due should be forced upon her or held longer for her .
Under the circumstances here, 1 think she is entitled to renounce, and whether
her refusal to accept further benefits from the trustee should be called a
disclaimer or not is probably not important . She cannot complain if the trustee
deals otherwise with the income, and no-one else is prejudiced . I see no reason
why, until further or other order of this court, the income now in the hands of
the executor, and the future income in question should not be disposed of by the
executor to those otherwise entitled .
It was held that, until the death of the widow, the income should be
paid to the persons who would be entitled on a partial intestacy, with
the exception of the widow . The disclaimer of her right to share in
the intestate estate was assumed to be effective .
Re Graydon is clearly not a strong authority, if it is any
authority, for the proposition that a true disclaimer of an income
interest can be made after income has been accepted . Gillanders J .
did not find it necessary to decide the point for the simple reason that
nothing turned upon it . Whether the document contained a release or
a disclaimer, the result would have been the same. The decision is
completely consistent with that in Re Guinness's Settlement .`t9
The decision in Re Graydon is, nonetheless, important because
the reasoning of the learned judge appears to have had some
ae Supra, footnote 21 .
;' Supra, footnote 43 .
"Ibid ., at pp . 133-134 .
49 S,iprcr, footnote 4 .
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influence in Re Coulson" in which the Court of Appeal overruled a
decision which appears to bear directly on the second question which
was discussed above .
In Re Skinner," an income beneficiary for life purported to
disclaim the income for one year . On the basis of the English
decisions on a beneficiary's attempt to disclaim part of the benefits
conferred upon him by a will, Addy J. held that the disclaimer was
ineffective : 52
It seems to me that on a fair reading of [the relevant paragraph] of the will, one
could not come to any' other conclusion but that the gift to the son . . . is a
single gift of the revenue from the residue of the testatrix's estate for life . There
is nothing there or elsewhere in the will to indicate that the gift would be one of
successive and severable yearly gifts of income, nor is there anything else in
the will which would indicate any right of disclaimer to part of the gift of the
income for life .
It does not appear from the report whether the beneficiary had
previously received income from the estate . On either view, the
decision and the reasoning appear to have been consistent with the
principles which have been applied in English courts .53 If that is
correct, the decision of the Court of Appeal in Re Coulson 54 appears
to indicate that those principles are not to be applied in the courts of
Ontario .
In Re Coulson a beneficiary who was entitled to income for her
life and had received income for many years executed a document in
which she did "renounce, disclaim and surrender all my right,
interest and benefits in the rents, profits and income from the
said . . . trust for the period commencing on the 15th day of July,
1975, and ending on the 14th day of July, 1976" . The document did
not indicate in whose favour the renunciation was made . A question
formulated for the advice of the court was whether the "Disclaimer"
by the life tenant was "effective to divest her of all her right and
interest in the income" of the testamentary trust for the period
specified . At first instance, Osler J ." felt obliged to follow Re
Skinner and answered the question in the negative . In delivering the
judgment of the Court of Appeal, Estey C .J . stated that the question
was the same as that considered in Re Skinner, that Addy J . had not
referred to Re Graydon, that the authorities relied upon by Addy J .
were cases of onerous bequests and that, having considered the
decisions in Ontario and in England, the court was unanimously of
the opinion that Re Skinner was wrongly decided . In the result it was
held that the disclaimer was effective notwithstanding the
so (1977), 16 O.R . (2d) 497 (C.A .) . St Supra, footnote 37 .
51 Ibid ., at p . 38 . Sa Supra, footnote 41 .
e4 Sttpra, footnote 50 . 11 Ibid ., at p . 499.
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beneficiary's receipt of income in previous years and notwithstand-
ing the fact that it was limited to a twelve month period .
On the basis of Re Coulson, it follows that the law of Ontario
provides answers to the three questions posed at the beginning which
are the reverse of the answers which the English decisions would
seem to support . There is, of course, no absolutely compelling
reason why principles of property law should develop in precisely
the same way in different jurisdictions, but it would be helpful if the
points of departure were clearly recognized and clearly indicated . It
is suggested that on the basis of the traditional principles the
reasoning in Re Coulson is open to criticism on the following
grounds :
(a) it ignored the fundamental rule that there can be no disclaimer after
acceptance ;
(b) by so doing, it blurred, if it did not totally obscure, the distinction
between disclaimers and other methods ofrenouncing an interest ; and
(c) it ignored the principle upon which the English cases on onerous gifts
were decided .
In view of the terms of Interpretation Bulletin IT-385, the
proposition that a renunciation of the kind in Re Coulson will be a
valid disclaimer would seem to carry with it the conclusion that the
income which is renounced will not be payable to the disclaiming
beneficiary within the meaning of subsection 104(13) of the Income
Tax Act and could not be taxed to him . Moreover, if disclaimers in
Ontario are to be regarded as operating by way of avoidance rather
than by way of disposition," and if this distinction is to be
recognized for the purposes of income tax, there would seem to be no
possibility that a disclaimer for a limited period, repeated, perhaps,
from year to year, will give rise to income attribution under
subsection 75(1) or subsection 56(4) of the Income Tax Act or
constitute a disposition of an income interest for the purposes of
paragraph 106(2)(a) . As a matter of taxation law these consequences
are at least as surprising as the propositions of property law which
are implicit in the decision in Re Coulson .
Finally, it should be mentioned that it does not seem possible to
explain the decision in Re Coulson by assuming that Estey C.J . was
using the term "disclaimer" in a non-technical sense and that, in
answering the question presented to the court, be merely recognized
the ability of the income beneficiary to dispose of her interest . Such
an interpretation would be inconsistent with the decision to overrule
Re Skinner .
M. C . CULLITY*
ss The decision inSmith v . Stuart (1866), 12 Gr . 246 (C.C.U.C .), suggests that
a disclaimer by a trustee will prevent the creation of an inter vivos trust . The English
law is that it will avoid the legal interest of the trustee without preventing the
beneficial interests from being acquired by the beneficiaries: Mallott v . Wilson,
[1903] 2 Ch . 494 (Ch.D .) .
*M . C . Cullity, of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University . Toronto .
